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AND YET IT MOVES: 
TAXATION AND LABOR MOBILITY IN THE 21st CENTURY 
 
Eppur si muove 
-Galileo Galilei 
 





A central premise of tax scholarship of the last thirty years has been the greater 
mobility of capital than labor. Recently, scholars such as Edward Kleinbard have 
recommended that the US adopt a variant of the “dual income tax” model used by 
the Scandinavian countries, under which income from capital is subject to 
significantly lower rates than labor income because of its supposedly greater 
mobility. This article argues that the premise upon which this argument is built is 
mistaken, because for individual US taxpayers (as opposed to corporations), there 
are significant limitations on their ability to avoid tax by moving their capital 
overseas. Moreover, if we focus on those taxpayers that pay the bulk of the income 
tax (i.e., the upper middle class and the rich), the data suggest that their ability to 
legally avoid taxation by expatriation is not significantly lower than their ability to 
evade it by moving capital, and lower income taxpayers are able to avoid both the 
income tax and the payroll tax (as well as a VAT) by emigration. The article then 
develops the policy implications, suggesting that (contrary to recent legislative 
trends) income from labor and capital should be subject to the same tax rates, but 
that these rates should be congruent with the price the US population is willing to 
pay for public services. 
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A central premise of tax scholarship of the last thirty years has been the greater 
mobility of capital than labor (the “capital/labor dichotomy assumption”).  The tax 
competition literature, for example, generally begins with the statement that the 
current era of globalization (from 1980 onward) differs from the previous one in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries because in the former period labor was as mobile 
as capital since there were no restrictions on immigration.2 In our globalization, 
however, labor faces immigration laws that restrict its mobility, while capital is free 
to move anywhere it wants at the click of a mouse.3 
 
Recently, important tax scholars such as Edward Kleinbard have drawn the natural 
policy conclusion and recommended that the US adopt a variant of the “dual income 
tax” model used by the Scandinavian countries, under which income from capital is 
subject to significantly lower rates than labor income because of its supposedly 
greater mobility.4 For example, in Sweden labor income is taxed at a top marginal 
rate of 56.6% under the income tax and another 25% under the VAT, while income 
from capital (dividends, interest and capital gains) is taxed at a “mere” 30% and the 
corporate tax rate (which is generally assumed in this literature to fall on capital) is 
only 26%.5 For the US, this argument suggests that we should (a) retain the 20% tax 
rate on dividends and capital gains, as enacted by the American Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 2012; (b) extend the 20% rate to interest; (c) lower the corporate tax, which at 
35% is the highest in the OECD; and (d) if additional revenue is needed, increase the 
tax rate on labor, either by raising the income tax rate on wages above 39.6%, or by 
enacting a VAT, or some combination of both. 
 
This article argues that the premise upon which this argument is built is mistaken, 
because for individual US taxpayers (as opposed to corporations), there are 
significant limitations on their ability to avoid tax by moving their capital overseas. 
Moreover, if we focus on those taxpayers that pay the bulk of the income tax (i.e., the 
upper middle class and the rich), the data suggest that their ability to legally avoid 
taxation by expatriation is not significantly lower than their ability to evade it by 
                                                        
2 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1573 (2000). The capital/labor dichotomy assumption is for example adopted in the seminal article by J.A. 
Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175, 176 (1971), which 
assumes that migration is impossible, although even then Mirrlees stated that this was an “assumption one 
would rather not make.” See below for discussion of some modern economics literature questioning the validity 
of the capital/labor dichotomy assumption. 
3
 See Jennifer Gordon, People are not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1109, 1113 (2010). “[T]he regulation of migration differs from its trade and investment counterparts along 
two dimensions: It is more restrictive and it reflects a lower level of international coordination.”  
4
 Edward Kleinbard, "An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents," 5 Northwestern Journal of Law 
and Social Policy 41, 43 (2010) “Under one of a dual income tax system’s two tax rate schedules, capital 
income is comprehensively defined and taxed at one relatively low proportional (flat) rate. Under the other 
schedule, labor income is taxed at progressive rates in both senses of the term.”  
5
 Seven-Olof Lodin, The Making of Tax Law: The Development of the Swedish Tax System (2012). 
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moving capital, and lower income taxpayers are able to avoid both the income tax 
and the payroll tax (as well as any potential US VAT) by emigration. The article will 
then develop the policy implications, suggesting that income from labor and capital 
should be subject to similar rates, but that these rates should be congruent with the 
price the US population is willing to pay for public services. 
 
After this introduction, part 1 of the article summarizes the previous literature on 
why the US should tax capital income earned by its residents, whether capital gains 
or dividends should be subject to lower tax rates, and what tax rate should apply to 
inbound portfolio investment. Part 2 of the article examines capital mobility and 
argues that for individual US citizens and residents, the ability to escape the income 
and estate taxes by moving capital overseas without moving themselves (as the 
capital/labor dichotomy assumption suggests) is quite limited. Part 3 argues that 
immigration restrictions have become much more tenuous in recent years, and that 
for lower income US citizens and residents, moving abroad is all that is needed to 
escape both the income tax and the payroll tax (as well as a potential VAT). For 
richer US citizens, there is the additional requirement of abandoning their US 
citizenship, but that too is not particularly onerous and is quite attractive from a tax 
perspective despite recent legal changes designed to make it less so. 
 
Part 4 of the article then draws the policy conclusion: In the US, income from capital 
should be taxed at the same rate as income from labor. What that rate should be is a 
central issue in every US election and should be left to the US electorate to decide on 
the basis of how many government services they are willing to pay for. 
 
I. Should Capital be Taxed at All? 
 
a. The Consumption vs. Income Tax Debate 
 
Before we address the issue of relative mobility of labor vs. capital, it is necessary to 
answer several preliminary questions:  
 
1. Should income from capital be taxed at all?  
2. If it should be, are there good reasons unrelated to mobility to tax capital 
gains or dividends at a lower rate?  
3. What about taxation of income from capital earned in the US by residents of 
other countries, i.e., inbound portfolio investment income? 
 
The first question is basically the one that has been the central focus of US tax 
literature since 1974, i.e., should the income tax (which falls on both capital and 
labor) be replaced with a consumption tax (which exempts at least the normal 
return on capital from tax but taxes wages in full). This section summarizes the 
previous literature on this question and concludes that the case for not taxing 
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The U.S. individual income tax was enacted in 1913 to replace existing consumption 
taxes (tariffs) on the ground that they were regressive.6 Until World War II, it was 
imposed mainly on upper income taxpayers and was imposed at low rates, 
compared with the current individual income tax rates.7 Even after the War, with 
rates soaring to 91 percent, the income tax enjoyed considerable popularity as the 
fairest tax.8 However, beginning with California’s tax revolt in the early 1970s, an 
increasing barrage of criticism has been leveled at the income tax on grounds of 
inefficiency and complexity.9 At the same time, perceptions of the income tax’ 
fairness have been undermined by the increasing use of sophisticated tax shelters 
by the rich to reduce or eliminate their income tax liability.10 While the 1986 Tax 
Reform achieved considerable simplification of the income tax by reducing its rates 
and expanding its base, subsequent enactments (especially in the late 1990s) have 
eroded the gains of the 1986 act and have once again prepared the ground for the 
advocates of radical tax reform to press for replacing the income tax with a 
consumption tax.11 
 
In the legal academic literature, the recent debate on the appropriate tax base began 
with Prof. William Andrews’ seminal 1974 article in the Harvard Law Review, 
published just as the decline of the income tax was beginning.12 Before Andrews, 
legal tax scholars assumed that a consumption tax had to be regressive because it is 
based on sales and therefore cannot take into account the personal characteristics of 
the buyer. Andrews, building on earlier economics literature (e.g., by Nicholas 
Kaldor), showed that in principle it is possible to achieve a consumption tax with a 
progressive rate structure built in. He did this by showing that on the basis of 
certain assumptions (to be explored below), allowing taxpayers to deduct all of their 
savings and applying graduated rates to them when they consume these savings is 
equivalent to not taxing the income from those savings at all. Thus, under the Haig-
Simons definition of income as consumption plus the increase in savings, exempting 
the income from savings is equivalent to only taxing consumption.  
 
Prof. Alvin Warren replied to Andrews by arguing that a cash flow consumption tax, 
as proposed by Andrews, is equivalent to an exemption of the returns to saving, and 
                                                        
6
 U.S. Const. amend. XVI 
7 See Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, Duties, and Advice, 12 Fla. 
Tax Rev 1 (2012) “Although the income tax began in 1913, it was World War II that created the modern 
income tax” 
8 Id. at 3. “Perhaps the most important different between the income tax then and now is that the system 
then enjoyed broad-based and bi-partisan support while imposing an extremely high top-end marginal rate 
of taxation (91-94 percent for most of this period).” 
9
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Report of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: A 
Critical Assessment and a Proposal, 59 SMU L. Rev. 551 (2006) 
10
 Id. at 552. 
11
 Id. at 552. 
12
 See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 
1113 (1974).  
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therefore only labor income will be taxed, which he considered unfair.13 Prof. 
Barbara Fried added that the supposed unfairness of taxing income “twice” (once 
when earned and again when it produces interest) is illusory, since it depends on 
using subjective utility rather than wealth as a measure of income.14 
 
In the voluminous literature that followed, proponents of the consumption tax have 
advanced three main arguments in its favor.15 First, they argued that it promotes 
efficiency by eliminating the deadweight loss from a tax on saving. Second, they 
argued that a consumption tax would boost national productivity by increasing 
national savings. Third, they argued that the consumption tax is considerably 
simpler than an income tax.16 
 
Opponents of the consumption tax have replied that the supposed efficiency gains of 
the consumption tax are exaggerated and depend crucially on imposing a one-time 
tax on accumulated wealth at the time of the transition from the income to the 
consumption tax, which is politically highly unlikely to happen. Moreover, the added 
incentive to save under a consumption tax depends on the crucial assumption that 
people do not have a set savings goal, because if they do they would decrease, rather 
than increase, their savings rate in response to a reduction of tax on savings. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence is ambiguous at best on whether tax decreases 
boost savings.17 Finally, the administrative advantages of the consumption tax 
depend crucially on its structure and may be lost if Congress builds in exemptions 
like it did in the income tax.18 
 
In recent years, the debate has shifted to three other issues, which will be discussed 
more extensively below. First, proponents of the consumption tax (beginning with 
Profs. Bankman and Griffith in 1992 and continuing more recently with Prof. David 
Weisbach) have argued that the actual difference between it and the income tax is 
minimal because neither can reach risky returns, and risk-free returns on capital 
have historically been very low.19 Second, Prof. Ed McCaffery has emphasized 
another point of similarity between a cash flow consumption tax and an income tax, 
                                                        
13
 See Alvin C. Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 Harv. L. 
Rev. 931 (1975); William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Warren, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 947 (1975). 
14
 Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 961 (1992). 
15
 For these arguments see generally Joseph Pechman (ed.), What Should be Taxed, Income or 
Expenditure? (1980). 
16 See, e.g., David Bradford, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1976); David Bradford, The Choice 
between Income and Consumption Taxes, 16 Tax Notes 715 (1982); David Bradford, Untangling the 
Income Tax (1986). 
17
 B. Doglas Bernheim, Taxation and Saving, NBER Working Paper 7061 p. 5 (1999). 
18
 See Pechman, supra. 
19
 Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a 
Debate About Risk? Does it Matter? 47 Tax L Rev 377 (1992); David Weisbach, The (Non-) Taxation of 
Risk, 58 Tax L Rev (2004). 
5
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in that they both reach inframarginal returns (rents), and therefore they can both be 
used to tax the rich, but the consumption tax is fairer because it taxes people only 
when they use their savings to enhance their lifestyle (and not when they use them 
to smooth their lifetime income patterns).20 Finally, Prof. Dan Shaviro has argued 
that a consumption tax can achieve the same degree of progressivity as the income 
tax, even though it does not appear to tax unconsumed income.21 Thus, proponents 
of the consumption tax argue that since the difference between an income tax and a 
properly structured consumption tax is minimal, but the consumption tax is 
administratively simpler than the income tax, it should be preferred. More recently, 
Profs. Bankman and Weisbach have argued that a consumption tax is always 
theoretically superior to an income tax, and Prof. Shaviro has argued that this view 
amounts to an academic “consensus.”22  
 
1. Should the Income Tax be Replaced by a Consumption Tax? 
 
In this section, I propose to address three recent arguments in favor of replacing the 
income tax with a consumption tax. Fundamentally, these arguments boil down to 
one assertion:  The consumption tax is not meaningfully different than the income 
tax in terms of its progressivity or ability to tax the rich. Therefore, not much will be 
lost if the consumption tax is adopted, and the relative administrative simplicity of 
the consumption tax favors its adoption. 
 
The three arguments in favor of equating the consumption and the income tax are 
(a) that neither can reach the returns on risky investments; (b) that both can reach 
inframarginal returns, and (c) that both can achieve identical progressivity. I will 
address each in turn. However, before turning to these arguments, it is necessary to 
re-examine the fundamental rationale for having an income tax in the first place. 
  
a. Why Tax Income? 
 
The individual income tax was adopted in the US in 1913, when the Sixteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress to tax incomes and overturned the Supreme 
Court’s Pollock decision of 1895, which held a previous attempt to tax incomes 
unconstitutional as a direct tax lacking apportionment.23 Before the Sixteenth 
Amendment was adopted, the federal government relied for revenues primarily on 
                                                        
20
 Edward McCaffery, The Fair Timing of Tax, 102 Mich. L. Rev. (2004). 
21
 Daniel Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 Tax Notes 91 
(2004); see also Mitchell L. Engler, A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 1205 
(2003); Mitchell L. Engler, Progressive Consumption Taxes, 57 Hastings L. J. 55 (2005). 
22
 Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal 
Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 745 (2007); Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach, Consumption Taxation is Still 
Superior to Income Taxation, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 789 (2007). 
23
 U.S. Const. amend. XVI. 
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tariffs and excises, which served to protect American industry from competition and 
were imposed on consumption goods.24 
 
The principal argument in favor of replacing the consumption-based tariff system 
with a personal income tax was that the tariffs were regressive.25 Since the poor 
consume a higher percentage of their income than the rich, a consumption tax is 
generally more regressive than an income tax.26 Economic developments in the late 
19th and early 20th century significantly increased the gap between rich and poor, 
and supporters of the income tax (primarily from the Southern and Western, more 
agricultural states) felt that the industrialists of the North-East had grown rich 
behind protective tariffs and should bear a greater part of the burden of financing 
the government.27 In addition, state personal property taxes had notoriously failed 
to reach intangible types of property like stock and bonds, further reducing the tax 
burden of the newly rich railroad, steel and oil magnates. 
 
I have argued elsewhere that the principal reason for taxing the rich today is similar 
to one of the major reasons why the personal and corporate income taxes were 
enacted in the early 20th century: Both were perceived as having the potential of 
curbing excessive accumulations of political, economic and social power by the 
rich.28  
 
There are two principal arguments why a liberal democratic state should curb 
excessive accumulations of private power. The first is the argument from 
democracy: In a democracy, all power should ultimately be accountable to the 
people. Private accumulations of power are by definition unaccountable, since the 
holders of power are neither elected by the people nor have their power delegated 
from the people’s representatives. In fact, the American Revolution was founded on 
the conception that while people have natural, Lockean liberal rights to their 
property, undue concentrations of private power and wealth should be discouraged.  
This view found its expression in the republican creed of civic humanism, which 
emphasized public virtue as a balance to private rights. A virtuous republic, the 
                                                        
24
 See Gregory L Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of Murphy v. Internal 
Revenue Service, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 185 (2007)“A careful review of tax history shows that the Supreme 
Court repeatedly recognized Congress’s ability to tax transactions, whether involving the proceeds form 
sale or exchange of property or the proceeds from the using of human capital, as duties or excises long 
before the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted.” (Pg 192). 
25
 See Avi-Yonah supra note 9. 
26 See Brian Galle and Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households and the 
Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 33 (2010) (Pg 42). 
27
 See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, A Law with a Life of Its Own. The Development of Federal Income 
Tax States Through WWI, 7 Pitt. Tax Rev. 1 (2009) (Pg 20).  
28
 The following is based on Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193 (2004); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, 
Equity, and Progressive Taxation (Review of Joel Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic 
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Founders believed, was to be free from concentrations of economic power such as 
characterized England in the 18th century. Therefore, from the beginning of the 
republic, federal and state legislators used taxation to restrict privilege and to 
“affirm communal responsibilities, deepen citizenship, and demonstrate the fiscal 
virtues of a republican citizenry.”  As Dennis Ventry has written, “[t]he ideal of civic 
virtue created a unique form of ability-to-pay taxation that was hostile to excess 
accumulation and to citizens who asserted entitlement through birth…Inherited 
wealth, as well as gross concentrations of wealth (inherited or not), characterized 
an aristocratic society, not a free and virtuous republic.”29 In the 20th century, the 
same view was best expressed in the corporate context by Berle, who wrote that in a 
democracy like the United States “it becomes necessary to present a system (none 
has been presented) of law or government, or both, by which responsibility for 
control of national wealth and income is so apportioned and enforced that the 
community as a whole, or at least the great bulk of it, is properly taken care of. 
Otherwise the economic power now mobilized and massed under the corporate 
form… is simply handed over, weakly, to the present administrators with a pious 
wish that something nice will come of it all.”30 
 
The other principal argument against excessive private power is based on a liberal 
conception of equality. Michael Walzer has explained that when liberals talk about 
equality, they are not concerned with “simple equality”, i.e., equalizing everyone’s 
initial means.31 Instead, they are advocating “complex equality,” by which Walzer 
means that every social “sphere” should have its own appropriate distributive 
principles and that possession of goods relevant to one sphere should not 
automatically translate into dominance in other spheres as well. “In formal terms, 
complex equality means that no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to 
one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard 
to some other good.”32 In our capitalist society, money is the “dominant good”, and 
the people who possess it are the most likely to accumulate illegitimate power in 
other spheres, such as politics. “This dominant good is more or less systematically 
converted into all sorts of other things- opportunities, power, and reputation.”33 
Walzer goes on to explain the insidious effects of money and why it needs to be 
curbed by redistribution, including redistributive taxation: 
 
Market imperialism requires another sort of redistribution, which is not so 
much a matter of drawing a line as of redrawing it. What is at issue now is the 
dominance of money outside its sphere, the ability of wealthy men and 
women to trade in indulgences, purchase state offices, corrupt the courts, 
exercise political power…the exercise of power belongs to the sphere of 
politics, while what goes on in the market should at least approximate an 
                                                        
29
 Dennis J. Ventry, Equity Versus Efficiency and the US Tax System in Historical Perspective, in Tax 
Justice: The Ongoing Debate (Thorndike & Ventry, eds., 2002), 28. 
30
 A. A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 Harv L Rev 1365, 1368 (1932). 
31
 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983). 
32
 Walzer, at 19. 
33
 Id., at 12. 
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exchange between equals (a free exchange)…When money carries with it the 
control, not of things only but of people, too, it ceases to be a private 
resource.34  
 
Nor, as we have noted above, is the power of money limited to direct political 
power: 
 
It would be a mistake to imagine, however, that money has political effects 
only when it “talks” to candidates and officials…It also has political effects 
closer to home, in the market itself and in its firms and enterprises…Even 
within the adversary relation of owners and workers, with unions and 
grievance procedures in place, owners may still exercise an illegitimate kind 
of power. They make all sorts of decisions that severely constrain and shape 
the lives of their employees (and their fellow citizens, too). Might not the 
enormous capital investment represented by plants, furnaces, machines, and 
assembly lines be better regarded as a political than an economic good? To 
say this doesn’t mean that it can’t be shared among individuals in a variety of 
ways, but only that it shouldn’t carry the conventional entailments of 
ownership. Beyond a certain scale, the means of production are not properly 
called commodities… for they generate a kind of power that lifts them out of 
the economic sphere.35 
 
Walzer thus advocates taxation as one means of restricting the market to its proper 
sphere (along with trade unions and limiting property rights). But he also 
recognizes the inherent limitations of all redistribution, since his aim is not to 
abolish the market: “All these redistributions redraw the line between politics and 
economics, and they do so in ways that strengthen the sphere of politics- the hand of 
citizens, that is, not necessarily the power of the state…But however strong their 
hand, citizens can’t just make any decisions they please. The sphere of politics has 
its own boundaries…Hence redistribution can never produce simple equality, not so 
long as money and commodities still exist, and there is some legitimate social space 
within which they can be exchanged.”36 
 
The personal income tax is one means by which the state can regulate the 
accumulation of private power. As I have argued elsewhere, the tax achieves this 
function in two ways: by directly limiting the rate of private wealth accumulation 
(the “limiting function”), and by providing incentives and disincentives to particular 
activities by the rich (the “regulatory function”). For reasons explained below, both 
functions are necessary and related to each other, in the same way that both a brake 
and a steering wheel are necessary for driving a car.37 
 
                                                        
34
 Id., at 120-21. 
35
 Id., at 121-22. 
36
 Id., at 122-23. 
37
 See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State, supra, 1246-1249. 
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First, the limiting function: Imagine first a 100% tax imposed on profits. Over time, 
such a tax would eliminate all sources of the power of the rich, since it would force 
them to use their existing resources to pay politicians and employees, and it would 
remove any incentive to accumulate further wealth. The power to tax is indeed 
potentially the power to destroy. 
 
But a 100% tax is inconceivable. Taxation faces an inherent limit that was well 
expressed by Holmes when he stated that “the power to tax is not the power to 
destroy while this court sits.” The constitution places limits on the power to tax, 
limits that are implicit already in Dartmouth College: The public sector may not use 
taxation to completely eliminate the private one. This is both a matter of 
constitutional law (a tax may be a taking if the rate exceeds any reasonable estimate 
of the state’s contribution to private wealth creation) and a matter of practicality: 
We do not want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs by imposing taxation at 
rates that create huge deadweight losses to the economy at large (the deadweight 
loss is approximately a square function of the tax rate). The precise limit of desirable 
taxation thus becomes the quintessential political question of our time, to be 
refought every four years at the ballot box.  
 
Given that we cannot tax at 100%, what is the effect on private power of a lower tax 
rate, such as the current 39.6%? Even at that historically low rate, the income tax 
does significantly slow down the accumulation of private resources, which are the 
foundation of private power. For example, imposing a tax at 39.6% on assets 
invested at a 10% yield (compounded annually) over ten years results in 
approximately 27% less assets being available at the end of the period than would 
be available in the absence of the tax. Thus, taxation at lower rates can meaningfully 
restrict the build-up of assets that forms the base of the power of the rich, even 
when it does not destroy it. But since that power will continue to exist and grow at 
any reasonable rate of taxation, we also need the tax to perform a regulatory 
function.  
 
Second, the regulatory function: The use of assets by the rich (i.e., their use of its 
power) may be impacted by the threat that the tax rate will be raised if it is 
perceived that the assets are not used for the betterment of society. This can be seen 
by the imposition of higher effective rates on certain forms of behavior Congress 
disapproved of, like bribes paid to foreign officials and participation in international 
boycotts.38 In both cases, empirical research has suggested the tax penalties had a 
significant impact.39 More recently, the threat of increased tax rates applied to US 
                                                        
38
 See I.R.C 999 (c) (1) 
39 See I.R.C 162 (c) (1); See James R. Hines, Taxed Avoidance: American Participation 
in Unsanctioned International Boycotts. NBER Working Paper, no. 6116. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, 1997; id., Forbidden 
Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977. NBER Working Paper, 
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corporations that moved their nominal place of incorporation to Bermuda seems to 
have sufficed to block one such “inversion” transaction and stop other corporations 
from adopting the same strategy.40 Thus, it seems that taxation even at rates much 
less than 100% can suffice to regulate private power.  But the rates cannot be set too 
low, because then the rich would not care sufficiently to avoid the tax. This is why 
we need the limiting function (i.e., set rates at sufficiently high levels for 
management to notice) for the regulatory function to work properly. 
 
Finally, in addition to providing disincentives, the tax can be used to provide 
incentives as well. For example, investment incentives are provided as a way of 
bolstering the economy.41 Another example is research and development, which has 
been shown by economists to produce significant positive externalities for society, 
which justify government in providing a subsidy via the tax code.42 Now it is of 
course true that the government could subsidize these functions directly, rather 
than use tax expenditures, so that this cannot strictly be an argument for taxing the 
rich. However, that would require setting up an IRS-like agency to monitor the use 
of the subsidies, so that any simplification advantage from abolishing the income tax 
is diminished. And once the income tax is in place, it seems like an obvious and 
convenient vehicle to deliver the desired subsidies at little additional cost.43 
 
Is the income tax the best vehicle for curbing excessive private power accumulation? 
An obvious alternative vehicle would be a direct wealth tax. However, in addition to 
concerns on its constitutionality, political experience since 1972 has shown that the 
American people are very averse to paying taxes on property, as indicated by the 
wave of property tax limitations and the near death experience of the estate tax.44 
Thus, the income tax remains the best way of reaching the sources of power of the 
rich, assuming that it can do so. 
   
b. Risk: Is There a Meaningful Difference? 
 
Can the income tax in fact tax the rich, or to put it another way, can it tax income 
from capital? If it cannot, then a strong argument can be made for replacing it with a 
consumption tax on administrative grounds, since if income from capital cannot be 
taxed an income tax has the same base as a consumption tax but is immensely more 
complicated (e.g., because it needs to account for basis).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     




 See Steven H Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 Fla Tax Rev. 71 (2008) (Pg 102) 
41
 See Avi-Yonah supra note 9 at 559. 
42
 Id., at 559. 
43
 See David Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J. 955 
(2004). 
44
 See Avi-Yonah supra note 9 at 559. 
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Beginning with Bankman and Griffith in 1992, a significant body of legal literature 
has argued that in fact the difference between income and consumption taxes is 
minimal, and therefore the consumption tax should be preferred on administrative 
grounds. Most recently, David Weisbach has argued that “a Haig-Simons tax is 
basically the same as a consumption tax (which imposes a zero tax on capital), and 
the debate between the two tax bases is not particularly meaningful. The decision 
might best be made on administrative grounds rather than on deep philosophical 
arguments about the proper distribution of the tax burden.”45 
 
The argument relied on by Bankman, Griffith, and Weisbach is based on an 
observation made by Domar and Musgrave in 1944, and expanded by many 
economists since then. Domar and Musgrave pointed out that if an individual is 
subject to (say) a 50% income tax on risky returns, he can eliminate that tax by 
increasing the amount invested, since the government shares equally in both his 
gains and his losses. Thus, suppose the individual makes a bet of $100 with an equal 
chance of winning and losing (e.g., a coin flip). Before tax, the individual would 
receive $100 if he wins and would pay $100 if he loses. If the government imposes a 
50% Haig-Simons income tax, the individual would only receive $50 if he wins 
(since he pays $50 in tax to the government) but would only lose $50 if he loses 
(since the government would in effect pay him $50 by allowing him to deduct the 
$100 loss at a 50% tax rate).  But if he could double the bet to $200, he would get 
$100 if he wins and pay $100 if he loses, putting him in the same position he was in 
if the tax was not imposed at all. 
 
Bankman, Griffith and Weisbach expand this proposition to argue that a Haig-
Simons income tax cannot be imposed on risky returns. They then go on to 
demonstrate that if the income tax can only be imposed on risk-free returns, since 
these have historically been very low (around 0.5%), the difference between an 
income tax and a consumption tax is so minuscule as to not be worth the argument.   
 
Various commentators have recently taken issue with this line of argument. Thus, 
Prof. Reed Shuldiner argues that the model is misleading for several reasons.46 First, 
in the case of investments rather than bets, grossing-up the investment is not 
costless: it involves both transaction costs and credit risk, since even rich 
individuals cannot borrow at the risk free rate of return. Second, he argues that the 
risk-free rate used by Bankman and Griffith is too low, because they used the period 
1945-1972, in which unexpected inflation was high; from 1972 to 1999 the risk-free 
rate was 1.5% and from 1802 to 1997 it was 2.9%. Moreover, the term of the rate is 
important: it should match the term of the investment, and the real risk-free rate for 
1972-1999 on ten year investments was 3.3%. Thus, the difference between the 
income and consumption tax, even on the assumptions underlying the Domar-
Musgrave model, is more significant than previous commentators have assumed. 
 
                                                        
45
 Weisbach, supra; see Bankman and Griffith, supra. 
46
 Reed Shuldiner, Taxation of Risky Investments, unpublished Ms. On file with author. 
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In addition, both Shuldiner and Prof. Larry Zelenak point out that the key 
assumptions underlying the model may not be accurate.47 First, individuals do not 
always behave with the kind of perfect rationality assumed by the Domar-Musgrave 
analysis. Second, we do not have a Haig-Simons income tax, as assumed in the 
model, because there are various loss limitations imposed by the income tax.  
 
First, individual behavior: Various empirical studies have attempted to examine 
whether individuals adjust their portfolios in the ways required for the Domar-
Musgrave analysis to be correct. Weisbach surveys this literature and concludes that 
“the empirical evidence is insufficient to sway us one way or another.”48 More 
broadly, economists have studied generally how sensitive the behavior of the rich is 
to taxes and concluded that in many cases that sensitivity is surprisingly low. For 
example, in most of the empirical studies in Joel Slemrod’s book on taxation and the 
rich, the expected tax avoidance behavior either did not materialize or was lower 
than expected.49 There are many considerations that influence individual behavior 
beyond taxes, and transactions costs make a difference as well. Since the 
consumption tax advocates are using the Domar-Musgrave result to advocate a 
radical change in our tax law, it seems to me that the burden should be on them to 
show that the risky returns are in fact not reached by the income tax, rather than (as 
Weisbach suggests) on the advocates of the income tax to show that the Domar-
Musgrave model is incorrect.   
 
Second, loss limitations: The existing income tax imposes various limitations on 
losses, such as the at-risk, passive activity, and capital loss limitations. In addition, it 
imposes graduated (progressive) tax rates, so that losses can sometimes be 
deducted at different rates than the rates applied to income. All of these limitations 
violate the Domar-Musgrave assumptions and result in a positive tax rate being 
imposed on the return to risk under the existing income tax. 
 
Various critics have rejected this argument on the ground that it is hard to find a 
normative justification for the particular pattern of taxing risk imposed by these 
limitations, except perhaps for progressive rates. In addition, Weisbach argues that 
this issue is irrelevant because the debate is about comparing Haig-Simons taxation 
to a consumption tax, not about the current income tax. 
 
However, the key question in this debate is not whether we do or do not have a 
perfect income tax. The key issue is whether the existing income tax succeeds in 
taxing the rich in ways that a real consumption tax would not.  A tax is just a means 
to an end, not an end by itself. If the purpose of having an income tax like the one we 
                                                        
47 Shuldiner, supra; Larry Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a 
Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. Rev. 879 (2006). 
 
48
 Weisbach, supra. See also the empirical study by Terrence R. Chorvat, The Effect of Taxation of Risky 
Income on Investment Behavior (2005) (finding no confirmation of Domar/Musgrave model in pilot 
experiment using law students). 
49
 See Joel Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich (2001). 
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have is to tax the rich, as argued above, the key issue is whether it succeeds in doing 
so. 
 
There is abundant empirical evidence that the income tax does in fact tax the rich. 
First, according to 2001 IRS data, the top 1% of the US population by adjusted gross 
income paid 33.89% of federal personal income tax, and the top 5% paid 53.25% 
(by comparison, the bottom 50% of the AGI distribution paid less than 4% of total 
income taxes collected). This is a significant increase from 1994, when the top 1% of 
taxpayers only paid 28.7% of federal personal income tax.50 In 2004, even after 
President Bush’s tax cuts, the top 1% still paid 32.3% of federal individual income 
taxes and the top 5% paid 53.7%.51 Since (as indicated below) a very large portion 
of the income of the rich consists of risky returns, it is hard to explain these patterns 
if risky returns are in fact exempt from tax. In 2008, the top quintile paid 94.6% of 
federal individual income taxes, the highest percentage since 1979.52  
 
Second, it appears likely that these significant payments by the rich are in large part 
the result of taxing risky returns to capital, not labor income or non-risky returns. 
There is a strong correlation between wealth and the percentage of an investor’s 
portfolio allocated to risky assets, so that it is likely that a significant portion of the 
rich’s income derives from risky assets. Specifically, the percentage of income from 
equity investments (dividends and capital gains), which are the most common type 
of risky asset, increases from 4% for taxpayers with income of $100,000 or less, to 
11.5% for taxpayers with income from $100,000 to $500,000, 24.7% for income 
between $500,000 and $1 million, 37.6% for income between $1 and $10 million, 
and an impressive 61.4% for taxpayers whose income exceeds $10 million.53 
Another indication that the income tax does reach risky returns is that total 
revenues from the federal personal income tax rose dramatically in the internet 
bubble of the late 1990s, and fell dramatically as the bubble burst in 2000. Most of 
that rise and fall is attributable to realizations of risky assets in the bubble years. 
 
It is not entirely clear why the return to risky assets is taxed under the existing 
income tax. A combination of loss limitations and limitations on investor behavior 
(such as transaction costs, credit risk, and myopia) may explain the observed 
pattern. However, the key issue is not why this result occurs but that in fact it 
occurs. The burden should be on the advocates of radical tax reform to show that 
the existing income tax (and not some theoretical construct like Haig-Simons) in fact 
fails to tax the rich on risky returns. It is after all the existing income tax that they 
seek to replace, not some ideal tax. If they can show that the top 1% by AGI will 
continue to bear over a third of the total burden of a consumption tax, then the 
reform would be more acceptable to those who believe in taxing the rich for the 
reasons stated above (or any other reasons).  
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Moreover, it seems to us that this distribution of the burden makes the existing 
income tax normatively attractive even if its particular rules operate in sometimes 
erratic ways. Thus, I disagree with Profs. Deborah Schenk and Larry Zelenak, who 
argue that the existing tax on capital is too unpredictable to be normatively 
attractive.54 We should look at the tax burden and its meaning from an aggregate, 
not from an individual perspective. A tax that is as progressive in its overall outcome 
as the existing income tax is worth defending even if its rules lead to strange results 
in individual cases. The key issue is the ultimate burden imposed on the rich, not the 
particular rules of the tax (progressivity, loss limitations, and the like).    
 
Finally, a word of caution is in order. The risk argument advanced by Bankman, 
Griffith and Weisbach bears a lot of similarity to the argument used (e.g., by 
Weisbach) to justify the adoption of the “check the box” rule in 1997 for classifying 
foreign entities as branches, partnerships, or corporations. Weisbach and others 
argued that taxpayers can in fact achieve any result they want under the existing 
classification rules, so that it would save administrative costs to replace these rules 
with a simple election.55 The results of this radical reform were catastrophic: it 
turns out that a vastly higher number of taxpayers made check the box elections and 
used classification to avoid the international tax rules. Apparently, there were 
significant transaction costs imposed under the pre-1997 regime that prevented 
taxpayers from achieving like results. This episode should lead us to be very 
cautious in relying on theoretical constructs like the Domar-Musgrave model to 
advocate replacing the income tax with a consumption tax because they are “just the 
same.” For whatever reasons, the current income tax succeeds in taxing the rich. It is 
highly doubtful that any consumption tax would achieve the same outcome 
(although as we will see below, some are better than others).    
 
 
c. Rents: Pre-paid vs. Post-paid Taxes 
 
Much of the consumption tax literature relies on the familiar Cary Brown theorem, 
which is studied in every basic tax class.56 The Cary Brown theorem demonstrates 
the theoretical equivalence, under certain assumptions, of pre-paid and post-paid 
consumption taxes in exempting the return to capital from tax. In a pre-paid tax, the 
tax is paid when the income is earned, just as in an income tax, but investment 
returns are exempt from tax. In a post-paid tax, a deduction is available for savings, 
so that income that is saved is not taxed, but investment returns are taxed when 
they are consumed.  
 
                                                        
54
 See Zelenak, supra; Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L Rev 423 
(2000).  
55
 See David Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L Rev 1627 
(1999). 
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 See Daniel Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 Tax Notes 1 
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To take a common example, suppose taxpayer earns 100 subject to a tax of 50% and 
can invest it in a bond earning 10% per year. Under an income tax, the 100 of 
earnings are subject to tax of 50, and the remaining 50 are invested in the bond, 
yielding 55 after 1 year; the 5 of interest is subject to income tax (Mill’s “double 
tax”) leaving the taxpayer with only 52.5. 
 
In a pre-paid consumption tax, the 100 of income is subject to tax of 50 when 
earned. The remaining 50 are invested in the bond, but when the additional 5 of 
interest is earned, they are exempt from tax, so that the taxpayer is left with 55.  
 
In a post-paid consumption tax, the 100 of income are saved, and the resulting 
deduction eliminates the tax on the 100, so that the taxpayer can invest the entire 
100 in the bond. However, when the bond is sold for 110 a year later and the 110 
are consumed, they are subject to tax at 50%, leaving the taxpayer with the same 55 
as in the previous example. 
 
Hence, the Cary Brown theorem demonstrates that pre- and post-paid consumption 
taxes are equivalent, and both exempt the 5 return on the bond from tax. Since 
income from capital is exempt, under the Haig-Simons definition of income, both 
pre- and post-paid consumption taxes are also theoretically equivalent to a direct 
tax on consumption like the Retail Sales Tax. 
 
The Cary Brown theorem makes two important assumptions. The first is that tax 
rates do not change between the time the income is saved and the time it is 
consumed. If the tax rate changes, the equivalence of pre- and post-paid 
consumption taxes does not hold, since a pre-paid tax applies the rate at the 
beginning of the year and a post-paid tax the rate at the end. However, this 
assumption may not matter too much since rates can either increase or decrease 
over time, so that it is unclear which form of the tax is more beneficial to the 
taxpayer. 
 
The other assumption, however, has clear implications. That is the assumption that 
the taxpayer can invest the savings from taking the tax deduction in a post-paid tax 
at the same rate as the underlying investment. This holds true when the investment 
is a commonly available one like a bond, yielding what the economists call marginal 
(normal) returns. However, suppose the underlying investment is in a unique 
business opportunity, yielding what the economists call infra-marginal 
(extraordinary) returns, or rents. In that case, the investor may not be able to invest 
the tax savings at the same rate as the underlying investment because the size of the 
unique investment opportunity is limited, and the Cary Brown equivalence does not 
hold.  
 
For example, suppose in the example above the underlying investment yields a 50% 
return but the tax savings can only be invested in a bond earning 10%. In a pre-paid 
tax, the taxpayer earns 100, pays 50 in tax, and invests the other 50 in the high-
yielding opportunity, resulting after a year in a 25 return exempt from tax, for a net 
16




after-tax of 75. In a post-paid tax, the investor earns 100 and does not pay tax 
because of the deduction for savings; however, of the 100, only 50 can be invested at 
a return of 50%, and the other 50 (the tax savings) are invested at 10%. The result is 
a yield after a year of 75 from the underlying investment and 55 from the tax saving, 
for a total of 130, and when these are consumed and are subject to tax at 50%, the 
taxpayer nets only 65. To put it another way, in a post-paid tax, only the normal 
yield is exempt from tax; the extraordinary yield is fully taxable. 
 
Ed McCaffery uses this result to argue for a post-paid consumption tax.57 In his view, 
such a tax is superior to an income tax because it does not tax the normal return to 
savings, but it is also superior to a pre-paid consumption tax because it does reach 
extraordinary returns to savings when they are consumed. Or to put it in other 
terms, the tax is deferred when savings are used to smooth income over a lifetime, 
but imposed when the savings are consumed above the return necessary for such 
smoothing. 
 
While I disagree with McCaffery about taxing unconsumed earnings, for the reasons 
explained above (and elaborated further below), I agree with him regarding the 
superiority of post-paid over pre-paid consumption taxes because of their ability to 
reach rents. Rents should be subject to high taxation in part because they are hard 
to replicate (and thus the deadweight loss from taxing them is small) and in part 
because they depend on luck (such as the distribution of various talents). The key 
issue is how common are such rents. There is an abundant literature that suggests 
that rents are common for corporations, and that may be why most serious 
consumption tax proposals (but not some of them) support a post-paid (cash flow) 
consumption tax for corporations. 
 
However, there is also evidence that in a “winner take all” society, rents are 
commonly earned by individuals as well.58 Consumption tax advocates sometimes 
argue that such rents are a form of labor income, not income from capital.59 Thus, 
the extraordinary returns earned by Bill Gates or Warren Buffett presumably result 
from their skill and luck and not primarily from capital invested (which in the case 
of Gates was minimal). However, it seems to me immaterial whether such rents 
earned by individuals are capital or labor income. They key issue is to ensure that 
they are taxed, and while the current income tax does not do a very good job in 
taxing them (primarily due to the realization requirement), it does a better job than 
a pre-paid consumption tax that exempts such rents altogether.60 Whether a post-
paid consumption tax can reach them depends on whether they are in fact 
consumed, which we will discuss below.  
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d. Regressivity: Can a Consumption Tax Achieve the Same 
Progressivity as an Income Tax? 
 
Many consumption tax advocates argue that a properly structured consumption tax 
can be just as progressive as the income tax. The most promising candidate from 
this perspective is a post-paid consumption tax, because as we have seen it can 
impose progressive rates on both labor income and on rents when those are 
consumed. On the other hand, transactional consumption taxes like the RST cannot 
generally be progressive since they are imposed at a uniform rate and since the poor 
consume a higher proportion of their income than the rich. Nor can pre-paid 
consumption taxes be as progressive because they exempt rents even when those 
are consumed.  
 
The key issue regarding regressivity is whether any consumption tax, even a post-
paid one, can be as progressive as an income tax given that it does not by definition 
reach income that is not consumed. The super-rich do not consume a significant 
portion of their income during their lifetime, and an income tax can in principle tax 
these earnings (or at least the risk-free portion of them) whereas even a post-paid 
consumption tax does not.61  
 
Dan Shaviro argues that this perception is mistaken because a consumption tax will 
always tax income whose consumption is deferred, even if it is deferred for a long 
time. He gives an example of taxpayers A and B who both consume $100,000 in a 
given year, but A has spent everything she earned whereas B has saved $1 million in 
the bank. Assuming a 50% consumption tax rate and 10% interest rate, A 
presumably earned $200,000 and B earned $1.2 million, and each paid $100,000 in 
tax. B’s remaining $1 million grows to $1.1 million and when it is consumed B pays 
$550,000 in tax. Shaviro points out that this is the same additional $500,000 in tax 
liability B would have had had she consumed everything in year 1, increased by the 
interest rate of 10% to take into account the one year deferral. Thus, A and B are in 
fact treated the same.  
 
More generally, Shaviro argues that any income is only worth what it can buy; 
“otherwise, it might as well be play money from the board games Monopoly or Life.” 
Thus, it is wrong to argue that a consumption tax fails to reach the indirect benefits 
of wealth-holding, such as security, political power, or social standing; this non-
sequitur “appears to rest on money illusion, or the mistaken belief that a dollar has 
inherent value, rather than being worth what it can buy.”62 
 
However, this argument ignores the fact that money can be used for other things 
than consumption. Most importantly, it can be used to acquire investments- both 
financial and real, such as manufacturing plants. And the key point made above is 
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that the power of the rich, which is (in my view) the principal target of the income 
tax, rests primarily on their ability to invest, not to consume. For example, it is the 
ability of corporations to choose which locations to open plants and create jobs that 
makes politicians so solicitous of their welfare- more, in fact, than their direct 
political contributions. But even in the case of political contributions, it is unclear 
whether those will be reached by a consumption tax, since it can persuasively be 
argued that these are a form of investment rather than consumption. Thus, a 
consumption tax will only reach the small percentage of the power of the rich that 
depends directly on their ability to consume, such as their personal employees or 
businesses that provide consumer goods to them. It will not reach the much larger 
percentage of their power that depends on their ability to invest. 
 
Theoretically, therefore, no consumption tax can achieve the goals of progressivity, 
which we have argued above are to curb the power of the rich, as well as an income 
tax. This does not mean that the current income tax does a very good job, although it 
appears from the data cited above to be quite progressive. Perhaps a consumption 
tax that taxes labor income at sharply graduated rates and also reaches actual 
consumption of saved income can be as progressive as the current income tax.63 
However, the burden should be on consumption tax advocates to show that this is 
indeed the case; the distributive tables of President Bush’s steps toward a 
consumption tax suggest otherwise.64 In addition, the income tax, because it reaches 
unconsumed income, can be made more progressive in ways that a consumption tax 
cannot, because it can reach the main source of the power of the rich- their 
unconsumed wealth.65          
 
e. Is an Ideal Consumption Tax Superior to an Income Tax?    
 
Professors Bankman and Weisbach have recently argued for the superiority of an 
ideal consumption tax over an ideal income tax on three grounds: First, that the 
consumption tax is more efficient because it does not discriminate between current 
and future consumption, while both income and consumption taxes have identical 
effect on work effort. Second, that the consumption tax is at least as good at 
redistribution as the income tax, and thus can equally satisfy vertical equity. Third, 
that the consumption tax is easier to administer than the income tax because it 
makes no attempt to tax income from capital and thus can omit many of the vexing 
complications that arise from such an attempt, like accounting for basis.66   
 
The argument in regard to redistribution is addressed above. In regard to efficiency, 
Bankman and Weisbach rely on a 1976 paper by Atkinson and Stiglitz, to argue that 
it is incorrect to claim (as Jane Gravelle does, for example, in The Taxation of Capital 
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Income (1994)) that there is a trade-off between reducing the disincentive to save 
by adopting a consumption tax, and reducing the incentive to work by increasing 
taxes on wages (to replace revenue lost as a result of exempting income from 
savings).67 Bankman and Weisbach argue that this is untrue because the tax on 
income from savings also reduces work effort. But it is quite plausible to assume 
that people systematically value future taxes less than current taxes by more than 
the time value of money, and if so, the current tax on wages will reduce work effort 
more than the present value of the future tax on savings. Bankman and Weisbach 
seem to acknowledge this (“perhaps one can offer various psychological theories for 
why people misperceive the effect of various taxes”), but dismiss it because “the 
trade-off theory purports to apply classical economics.”68 However, the debate is 
about effects in the real world of replacing the income tax with a consumption tax, 
not in some ideal realm of classical economics.  
 
Similarly, the argument in regard to administrability depends crucially on the actual 
consumption tax that will be adopted- the experience of other countries with the 
VAT indicates it has significant problems of complexity and administrability. David 
Gamage has recently pointed out that if one assumes that the transaction costs of 
avoiding taxes increase with the amount of tax to be avoided, then having two taxes 
with lower rates (income tax and VAT, for example) is superior to having only one 
tax at a higher rate, because taxpayers will then have an incentive to incur those 
higher transaction costs.69 
 
The most recent contributions to this debate are two chapters in the UK Mirrlees 
Review, a comprehensive analysis of the UK tax system that resulted in two thick 
volumes, Dimensions of Tax Design70 (review and analysis) and Tax by Design71 
(recommendations). Interestingly, these two volumes reach opposite conclusions 
regarding the desirability of taxing the normal return to capital (they agree that 
taxing rents is desirable). The chapter on capital income taxation in the first volume, 
by Banks and Diamond, summarizes recent economics literature and concludes that 
the case for not taxing capital income is not at all obvious in light of the many 
possible roles that capital income taxes might play. Banks and Diamond point out 
that the efficiency gains from moving to a consumption tax rely on not having any 
transition relief, which may be politically impossible; that the distortions of taxing 
capital may be minimized by the fact that a capital income tax may only reach the 
risk-free rate of return; that market imperfections may make capital income 
taxation more attractive; and that capital income may be an indicator of ability, even 
given labor income. This last argument, first developed by Saez, has been 
emphasized in recent work by Dan Shaviro and others.  In addition, it can be argued 
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that taxing the returns to saving, by discouraging private saving, can help implement 
progressive labor income taxes by making it more painful for people with high 
ability not to work. 
 
In the second volume of the Mirrlees Review, the editors summarize these findings 
by stating that— 
 
All of these arguments are well founded in economic theory. They justify 
levying some tax on the normal return to capital, though not necessarily at 
full income tax rates, as in a comprehensive income tax. However, there are 
several reasons to be cautious in applying these arguments immediately to 
policy.72 
 
These reasons for caution, the editors argue, are that it is hard to know what the 
capital income tax rate should be, and not clear that having a small positive capital 
income tax rate provides sufficient benefit to justify the complexity of 
implementation. Thus, the editors of Tax by Design recommend not taxing the 
normal return to capital, contradicting the recommendation by Banks and Diamond 
in Dimensions of Tax Design.  
 
If Nobel-Prize winning economists cannot agree on whether income from capital 
should be taxed and at what rate, then surely reasonable minds can differ on this 
question. But a radical reform such as switching from income to consumption 
taxation should require a high level of consensus. Moreover, as a practical matter, it 
seems unlikely that any of this economic analysis will lead to replacing the US 
income tax with a consumption tax. Even the 2005 Bush tax reform commission was 
unable to reach a consensus on exempting the normal return to capital from 
taxation.73  
 
Instead, it is much more likely that the US will follow all the other members of the 
OECD and enact a consumption tax (the VAT) in addition to, and not as a 
replacement of, the income tax. Such a low rate VAT could be used to fund the 
entitlement programs, whose costs are the main medium- and long-term threat to 
our fiscal stability. The arguments for adopting an add-on VAT have been developed 
elsewhere.74 
     
 
b. Taxation of Capital Gains 
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Even if the consumption tax option is rejected, there may be other reasons to subject 
certain forms of income from capital to a lower rate than labor income. Specifically, 
we have usually taxed long-term capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income. 
In addition, we have recently extended this lower rate to dividends as well. Are 
these departure from the norm justified? I will address each in turn. 
 
There are four reasons why we may want to apply a lower rate to long-term capital 
gains than to ordinary income, as we have in fact done for most of the past century 
with the exception of 1986-1991. The first three stem from the realization 
requirement. If capital gains are only taxed upon realization, then (a) there is a “lock 
in” effect because taxpayers are reluctant to sell appreciated assets and trigger the 
capital gains tax, (b) some of the gain, especially on long-term assets, is illusory 
because we do not index basis to inflation; and (c) “bunching” the entire gain in one 
year (upon realization) may cause taxpayers to move to a higher tax bracket in a 
progressive tax system.75 
 
However, none of these reasons strike me as persuasive, because they can all be 
dealt with by the relatively simple method of adopting a mark to market tax regime. 
Under mark to market or accrual taxation, there is no lock in effect because 
taxpayers pay tax (and basis increases) on the annual fluctuation in value of their 
assets. There is no gain due to inflation because all assets are taxed currently. And 
there is no bracket creep because there is no bunching of gain in the year of sale. 
 
As David Miller and others have shown, such a mark to market system is perfectly 
feasible for most assets, because valuation and liquidity are not an issue for most 
asset types.76 The big exception is owner occupied housing, but we exempt most 
such housing gains from capital gains tax in any case.77 
 
The fourth reason rests on the assertion that cutting capital gains taxes helps capital 
formation and increases investments. I have seen no persuasive empirical evidence 
that this in is fact the case.78 Recent studies in behavioral economics have suggested 
that institutional factors matter more in promoting savings than the tax rate on 
capital income, and that a series of specific tax-favored savings promotion schemes 




c. Taxation of Dividends 
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Historically, the US has generally taxed dividends at the same rate as ordinary 
income. This changed in 2003, when Congress adopted a 15% rate for dividends as 
well as capital gains. The rate for dividends went up to 20% under ATRA, which is 
about half the rate for ordinary income (and the same as the rate for capital gains).80 
 
The rationale for taxing dividends at a lower rate is that this is a form of 
corporate/shareholder tax integration. Historically, there have been three reasons 
advanced for countries to adopt corporate/shareholder integration, to overcome biases in 
the classical system (under which corporate income is taxed at the corporate level and 
dividends are taxed in full at the shareholder level): 
  
     1. Under the classical system, there is a bias to conduct 
        business in noncorporate forms, since they are not subject to 
        double taxation (although this is mitigated if the individual 
        rate exceeds the corporate rate, since in corporate form the 
        individual tax can be deferred). 
  
     2. Under the classical system, there is a bias to avoid dividend 
        distributions and instead retain earnings, thus avoiding the 
        double tax (this bias is exacerbated when the individual rate 
        exceeds the corporate rate); 
  
     3. Under the classical system, there is a bias in favor of 
        capitalizing corporations with debt (producing deductible 
        interest) rather than equity (producing nondeductible 
        dividends).
81
 
None of these reasons is completely convincing in the U.S. context, which may be a 
reason why the U.S. has maintained the classical system from 1936 to 2003 (and indeed 
strengthened it in 1986 with the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, which enabled 
corporations to avoid corporate tax on a distribution of appreciated assets). First, the 
alleged bias against the corporate form is mitigated by the excess of the individual rate 
over the corporate rate (as is currently the case, and the gap will increase if the corporate 
rate is cut) and by the absence of strong provisions to prevent retentions in the domestic 
context. In addition, under current rules, the classical system applies primarily to large, 
publicly traded corporations, while small, closely held businesses are able to avoid the 
double tax even if they are in corporate form for nontax purposes. It is doubtful if there is 
sufficient substitutability between the two forms of business for the double tax to create 
much deadweight loss from the bias toward noncorporate form. The double tax is a price 
large businesses have to pay for access to the public equity markets and the liquidity that 
accompanies that access. Finally, to the extent that the corporate tax can be shifted to 
consumers or to labor, the bias disappears, and even the Treasury's 1991 integration study 
                                                        
80 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Ira B. Shepard, and Daniel L. Simmons, Recent Developments in Federal 
Income Taxation: The Year 2010, 10 Fla. Tax Rev. 565 (2011) (Pg 616). 
81
 See Avi-Yonah supra note 9. 
23
Avi-Yonah:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
24 
 
has suggested that considerable shifting can take place. (The bias reappears again if 
noncorporate businesses can likewise shift the individual tax burden, but it seems 




Second, the bias in favor of retentions is mitigated by the ability of corporations to 
redeem shares from shareholders at the favorable capital gains rate, and by the fact that 
numerous shareholders are tax exempt or corporate (and thus do not pay a full tax on 
dividends). Indeed, even U.S. corporations that used to pay dividends have now generally 
moved to structured redemption programs addressed to their taxable individual 
shareholders. Other corporations (especially high-tech ones) retain all their earnings, but 
it is not clear that this is primarily tax motivated (corporations used to pay dividends 
under the same rules in the past). Finally, there is an unresolved debate among 
economists whether the dividend tax is capitalized into the price of the shares. If it is, 
then the retention bias applies only to new equity, but new equity is unlikely to pay 
dividends for nontax reasons.
83
 
Third, the bias in favor of debt and against equity is a general problem of the income tax 
that should not be addressed only in the corporate tax area. Moreover, to address it 
completely it is necessary to make dividends not exempt, but rather deductible, a form of 
integration that is never adopted (in part because it would automatically extend 
integration to foreign and tax-exempt shareholders). If integration takes the normal forms 
of imputation or dividend exemption, there is still a difference in treatment between 
interest and dividends that can be manipulated.
84
 
These arguments suggest that the US should resume taxing dividends as ordinary income. 
That is particularly true if capital gains are taxed as ordinary income as recommended 
above, because the best reason for the current 20% rate on dividends is that this is the rate 
for capital gains and therefore there is less pressure to distinguish capital gains from 
dividends. 
However, if one nevertheless believes in integration, in my opinion the best way to 
achieve integration is to allow corporations to deduct dividends.
85
 The case for dividend 
deduction has been developed elsewhere, but if dividends are deductible like interest, 




d. Inbound Portfolio Investment 
 
 
The economics literature unanimously recommends that small open economies not 
subject inbound portfolio investment to income tax, because the mobility of such 
capital means that any such tax will be shifted to labor in the source country and it is 
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simpler to tax labor directly.86 The US follows this recommendation for capital gains 
and interest, but not for dividends, which are subject to withholding at 15% or 30% 
(and this tax has recently been strengthened by Congress imposing it on dividend 
equivalent payments on derivatives). 
 
In my opinion, portfolio capital mobility indicates that the US should not subject any 
inbound portfolio capital to tax, and withholding taxation should be abolished. It is 
cumbersome, complex, and raises little revenue. Nor is it needed to induce countries 
to enter into tax treaties with the US, because most countries that want such treaties 
(i.e., developed countries and large developing ones) already have them and the 
others (smaller developing countries) are unlikely to want them because they are 
uninterested in reducing US taxation on their mobile capital (which from their 
perspective represents undesirable capital flight). 
 
Thus, the US should continue not to tax inbound portfolio interest and capital gains, 
and should extend this treatment to inbound portfolio dividends. There are, 
however, three caveats. First, the US should have robust mechanisms in place to 
ensure that payments to foreigners are truly to foreigners and not to US residents 
pretending to be foreigners. This means that US payors should obtain enough 
information to exchange with other countries to enable the US to ascertain who the 
beneficial owner of such payments is. FATCA is also helpful in this regard.87 Second, 
the US should retain its ability to subject inbound direct investment to tax, because 
FDI has good reasons to be in the US and is therefore much less mobile. As Lowell 
and Wells have argued, this indicates that we should levy a base protecting tax on all 
deductible payments made to foreigners- interest, royalties, and if dividends are 
deductible, then on dividends as well.88 Moreover, we should tax capital gains from 
the sale of controlling interests in US corporations, since these represent the present 
value of future US source active income from FDI.89 Third, if the other OECD 
countries were willing to cooperate, we could reinstate conditional withholding on 
all payments to non-treaty countries, but refund the tax upon a showing that the 
income was declared to the taxpayer’s country of residence. This would eliminate 
the tax haven problem without the need to place sanctions on small offshore 
jurisdictions and without driving portfolio investments elsewhere, because such 
investments are generally not made in countries outside the OECD. 
 
The tax rate on inbound portfolio capital should therefore generally be zero. The tax 
rate on inbound labor is also zero: With the exception of artistes and athletes, the US 
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(like other countries) does not tax labor income of those who come to it 
temporarily, unless their activities are so extensive that they become US tax 
residents (i.e., are present for 183 days in any given year or have a US trade or 
business/ permanent establishment). For inbound capital and labor, therefore, the 
main recommendation of this article (to tax them at the same rate) has largely been 
adopted already.90 
 
But what about income from capital and labor earned by US residents? We now 
finally arrive at the main question posed by this article- should income of US 
residents from capital and labor be subject to different rates because of the 
capital/labor dichotomy assumption? 
 
 
II. How Mobile is Capital? 
 
 
A major reason for the capital/labor dichotomy assumption is the focus on 
corporate as opposed to individual taxation. There is in fact abundant evidence that 
US corporations can easily escape the onerous US corporate tax rate of 35% by 
moving their profits to lower taxed locations.  For example, in November 2011 CTJ 
and ITEP released a report called “Corporate Taxpayers and Corporate Tax Dodgers, 
2008-2010.”  After examining the 280 most profitable U.S. corporations, they found 
that the average effective federal income tax rate for this group was 18.5% in 2008-
2010 and 17.3% in 2009-2010.  In other words, 280 of the Fortune 500 companies 
were paying tax at half the 35% statutory rate.  Some 78 of these companies paid no 
federal income tax between 2008 and 2010. General Electric, the largest corporation 
in the United States, reported some $10.450 billion in profits for 2008-2010 and yet 
paid no U.S. income tax during those years.91  
 
A major reason for these low tax payments by leading US corporations was their 
ability to shift profits overseas. GE, for example, made most of its money in its GE 
Capital division, which books most of its profits in Barbados and benefits from the 
“active financing” exception to Subpart F (enacted in 1997 over President Clinton’s 
veto).  The Transfer Pricing study by the Joint Committee on Taxation (July, 2011) 
documented how six US multinationals used legal transfer pricing techniques to 
move most of their profits to low tax locations like Ireland, Luxembourg or 
Singapore.92  As a result, deferral (the ability not to pay tax on profits booked 
offshore) is now the biggest US corporate tax expenditure, and $1.7 trillion of low-
taxed profits of US multinationals are “trapped” overseas, since under current law 
bringing them back to the US would trigger a 35% tax penalty. In addition, 
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corporations can move themselves overseas by shifting their headquarters there, 
and corporate residency is rather meaningless.93 
 
But from the perspective of the capital/labor dichotomy assumption, this focus on 
the corporate tax is misleading, because after over 50 years of research economists 
cannot tell us who bears the burden of the corporate tax: Is it shareholders, or all 
capital providers (as Harberger argued in 1963), or labor, or consumers (i.e., labor), 
as more recent studies indicate? For distributional purposes Congress and Treasury 
assume that the corporate tax falls on capital, but their own studies suggest that it 
falls at least 50% on labor. My own guess is that it shifts based on market conditions 
(i.e., it falls on shareholders only when competition means that it cannot be shifted 
to consumers or employees), and therefore there is no answer that can possibly be 
given to the question, “does the corporate tax fall on capital or labor?”. Moreover, 
the increasing ability of corporations to move jobs offshore suggests that they 
should be able to make labor bear more of the corporate tax burden. 
 
Moreover, let us assume for the moment that the corporate tax does fall mostly on 
capital, as recent Treasury estimates and academic literature have suggested.94 This 
by itself does not tell us anything about what should be the proper tax rate on 
dividends, capital gains and interest earned by individual taxpayers. If corporations 
can avoid the corporate tax by legally shifting income overseas, that suggests the 
corporate tax rate should be low, but it does not mean that individual capital 
providers to corporations should be subject to a lower tax rate than wage earners 
unless we thing they can also avoid tax on dividends, capital gains or interest by 
shifting those overseas. If anything, I would argue that if the corporate tax falls on 
capital but can be avoided by corporations, while individual capital providers to 
corporations cannot easily avoid tax on dividends, capital gains and interest, the 
correct policy response is to reduce the corporate tax rate and to increase the tax 
rate on dividends and capital gains. 
 
We should therefore leave the corporate tax aside as irrelevant to the capital/labor 
dichotomy assumption (although I would support lowering the corporate tax rate, 
as both the Obama Administration and Republicans in Congress have proposed, 
precisely because corporate profits are in fact mobile and respond to tax rates). The 
relevant question for assessing the capital/labor dichotomy assumption is whether 
individual US residents and citizens can escape the income tax on dividends, interest 
and capital gains by moving their capital overseas without moving themselves 
(since, if they move themselves, this shows that labor is mobile and violates the 
assumption). 
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The answer to this question is generally no. First, US citizens and residents cannot 
legally escape the income or estate taxes by moving capital offshore, since (a) they 
are subject to income tax on all income (“from whatever source derived”) and to 
estate tax on worldwide assets, and (b) if they try to earn their income through 
foreign corporations, whether controlled or not, they are still subject to tax under 
the quite onerous PFIC rules (which are much tougher than the analogous CFC rules 
for corporate taxpayers).95 
 
Second, even if one could argue that US citizens and residents can in practice avoid 
these rules by hiding income in tax havens, they face a significant risk of getting 
caught: As illustrated by the recent UBS saga, if one banker spills the beans, they can 
and do go to jail. Most of the economics literature is not based on the assumption 
that most people would be willing to risk going to jail. 
 
Third, recent changes to US law have made such illegal tax evasion considerably 
more difficult.  FATCA, enacted in 2010, requires all foreign financial institutions to 
report directly to the IRS all accounts held by US citizens or residents. The penalty 
for non-compliance is a hefty 30% levy on the financial institution’s US source 
income. In addition, the US has finally decided to make its own banks collect 
information on interest paid to non-residents, both because they may be residents 
pretending to be non-residents, and because the US wants to have information to 
exchange with treaty partners who have information on US residents.  
 
The highest published estimate of the ability of US citizens and residents to escape 
taxation by moving capital overseas is $50 billion in income tax evaded per year.96 
Even this upper bound estimate is a very small fraction of total income from capital 
earned by US citizens and residents. The IRS estimate of the “international tax gap”, 
using better (non-public) data, was always much lower. And even I, as the originator 
of the $50 billion estimate, would now admit that in the post-FATCA environment, 
that figure is too high.  
 
It is not impossible to escape FATCA. A US citizen or resident can still do it by 
earning income overseas in a financial institution that has no connections to the US 
and therefore is not intimidated by the 30% levy. But these institutions are hard to 
find, especially without moving abroad (which violates the capital/labor dichotomy 
assumption). Even the Iranians found that it was hard to receive payment for their 
oil without routing the money through the US financial system. 
 
Thus, in my opinion the transaction costs for a US citizen or resident living in the US 
to escape taxation on capital income without moving abroad are now so high that 
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capital from this perspective is not particularly mobile. It can still be moved, but it 
will in all likelihood be taxed. 
 
III. How Immobile is Labor? 
 
The second half of the capital/labor dichotomy assumption is that labor is immobile 
because of immigration restrictions. But this ignores the data that indicate that in 
the 21st century labor is quite mobile and borders are porous.97  
 
First, for low earners, there is significant immigration, both legal and illegal. In the 
EU there are currently 47 million people (9.4% of the total population) who were 
born outside their country of residency, including 31 million (6.3%) born outside 
the EU.  There are an estimated 11 million “undocumented” migrants in the US, in 
addition to the 29 million who migrated to the US legally.  These 40 million 
immigrants represent over 10% of the current US population.98 
 
Second, for high earners, who earn the vast bulk on income from capital, the 
restrictions on legal migration are almost non-existent. Most countries in the OECD 
welcome rich migrants.99 About 340,000 income taxpayers have left France each 
year since 2000 to relocate to countries with lower income taxes like the UK, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, the US and Canada. Before migrating, these individuals 
paid three times more taxes than the average French taxpayer.100 In 2005, 145,000 
taxpayers left Germany for the same reason.101 
 
And what are the tax consequences of migration? For low earners migrating out of 
the US, the result is to legally escape all US taxation.102 The payroll tax does not 
apply to US citizens and residents who move permanently overseas and work for 
non-US employers.103 A VAT, since it is destination based, can likewise be avoided 
by simply moving offshore. And under section 911 of the Code, the first $92,900 of 
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earned income of US citizens living overseas is exempt from US income tax, which 
covers the vast majority of the US middle class who only have labor income.104 
 
For high earners, migration by itself is insufficient, because the US uniquely taxes its 
citizens on worldwide income even if they live permanently overseas.105  I do not 
like this rule and have argued that it should be changed, but it is unlikely to be 
modified because it has been entrenched in US income tax law since the Civil War.106 
But upper income US citizens can still escape taxation by simply moving and then 
going to a US consulate and relinquishing their US citizenship. Since they can easily 
obtain citizenship in other OECD countries because all countries welcome rich 
migrants, the costs of such a move are not very high. A US passport is not more 
valuable, and in some ways less useful, than an EU, Australian or Canadian passport. 
 
Paradoxically, these costs have been diminished rather than increased by a legal 
change enacted in 2008 to make tax-motivated expatriation harder. Before 2008, to 
avoid continued taxation as a US resident, the expatriating citizen had to show a 
non-tax reason for expatriating. That proved to be easy and as far as I know the IRS 
has not been able to prevail in any case brought under Code section 877 before 
2008.107 Code section 877A, enacted on a bipartisan basis in 2008, imposed an exit 
tax on rich expatriates: Any wealthy US citizen who moved abroad and renounced 
citizenship is now subject to a deemed sale of all their assets. The result can be seen 
in the following table, which shows how many US citizens gave up their citizenship 
in each year since 1998: 
 
YEAR NUMBER SOURCES 
1998 450 63 Fed. Reg. 42906 (Aug. 11, 1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 56696 (Oct. 
22, 1998);  64 Fed. Reg. 3339 (Jan. 21, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 
48894 (Sept. 8, 1999); 65 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Mar. 20, 2000) 
1999 435 64 Fed. Reg. 19858 (Apr. 22, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 38944 (July 
20, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 56837 (Oct. 21, 1999); 65 Fed. Reg. 
5020 (Feb. 2, 2000) 
2000 432 65 Fed. Reg. 35423 (June 2, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 48913 (Sept. 
24, 2001); 65 Fed. Reg. 50050 (Aug. 16, 2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 
80494 (Dec. 21, 2000) 
2001 491 66 Fed. Reg. 48912, 48917 (Sept. 24, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 
11374, 11375 (Mar. 13, 2002) 
2002 503 67 Fed. Reg. 193621 (Apr. 22, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 47889 (July 
22, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 66456 (Oct. 31, 2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 
4549 (Jan .29, 2003) 
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2003 569 68 Fed. Reg. 23180 (Apr. 30, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 44840 (July 
30, 2003); 69 Fed. Reg. 61906, 61910 (Oct. 21, 2004) 
2004 631 69 Fed. Reg. 61907, 61908, 61909 (Oct. 21, 2004); 70 Fed. Reg. 
5511 (Feb. 2, 2005) 
2005 761 70 Fed. Reg. 23295 (May 4, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 68511 (Nov. 
10, 2005); 71 Fed. Reg. 6312 (Feb. 7, 2006); 71 Fed. Reg. 68901 
(Nov. 28, 2006) 
2006 278 71 Fed. Reg. 25648 (May 1, 2006); 71 Fed. Reg.50993 (Aug. 28, 
2006); 71 Fed. Reg.63857 (Oct. 31, 2006); 72 Fed. Reg.5103 
(Feb. 2, 2007) 
2007 470 72 Fed. Reg. 26687 (May 10, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 44228 (Aug. 
7, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 63237 (Nov. 8, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 7631 
(Feb. 8, 2008) 
2008 231 73 Fed. Reg. 26190 (May 8, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 43285 (July 24, 
2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 65036 (Oct. 31, 2008); 74 Fed. Reg. 6219 
(Feb. 5, 2009) 
2009 741 74 Fed. Reg. 20105 (April 30, 2009); 74 Fed. Reg. 35911 (July 
21, 2009); 74 Fed. Reg. 60039 (Nov. 19, 2009); 75  Fed. Reg. 
9028 (Feb. 26, 2010) 
2010 1391 75 Fed. Reg. 28853 (May 24, 2010); 75 Fed. Reg. 69158, 69160 
(Nov. 10, 2010); 76  Fed. Reg. 7907 (Feb. 11, 2011) 
2011 1780 76 Fed. Reg. 27175 (May 20, 2011); 76 Fed. Reg. 46898 (Aug. 
3, 2011); 76 Fed. Reg. 66361 (Oct. 26, 2011); 77 Fed. Reg. 5308 
(Feb. 2, 2012)  
 
What is clear from this table is that expatriations went down in 2008 (when the law 
was being considered in Congress), and then increased dramatically. The average 
expatriation rate in 1998-2008 was 477. The average expatriation rate in 2009-
2011 was 1304, over 2.7 times as much. 
 
The reason for this increase was that after 2008 expatriation was no longer a 
shameful act. Instead, it became an act with a price set by the government. Rich US 
citizens living overseas could make the calculation: Is the current exit tax I have to 
pay more or less than the present value of my future US taxes, both income and 
estate tax, taking into account the likely future trend of US tax rates and the tax rate 
in the country I live in? In many cases, the argument for expatriating became 
overwhelming, despite patriotic misgivings. 
 
Thus, I believe that labor is as mobile or more mobile than capital from the 
perspective of its ability to escape US taxation by moving.108 The same applies to 
other countries that have an exit tax on moving and do not tax citizens living 
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permanently overseas. The capital/labor dichotomy assumption is wrong, and labor, 
like Galileo’s Earth, does move despite all the claims to the contrary.  
 
 
IV. Policy Implications 
 
The policy implications of the above argument are simple: We should go back to 
Charles Tiebout’s famous conclusion from 1956 that if people are mobile, countries 
should set tax rates to reflect the taste of their residents, and those residents that do 
not like the resulting choice (which is established by democratic elections) should 
be free to move to other countries whose choices they like better.109 
 
For the US, the immediate policy implications are that we should (a) set the tax rate 
on dividends and capital gains to be the same as the tax rate for interest and wages, 
which is a significant simplification over current law because then we do not have to 
worry about distinguishing (at the recipient level) dividends from interest, 
dividends from capital gains, and dividends/capital gains from wages; (b) have an 
election every four years in which the proper rate for taxing all income is debated 
and decided; (c) let people who do not like the result move overseas, and stop taxing 
them there even if they retain US citizenship, since they no longer obtain significant 
services from the US government. However, as long as we do not mark assets to 
market, we should impose an exit tax on such migrants, to the extent that the 
unrealized appreciation in their assets was economically earned while they were US 
residents. 
 
The recently enacted American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 has permanently 
enshrined in the tax code the pernicious distinction between ordinary income 
(taxed at almost 40%) and capital gains and dividends (taxed at about half that 
rate). This distinction is very difficult to police in practice and completely 
unnecessary, since (as argued above) all the reasons for taxing capital at a lower 
rate than ordinary income are shaky at best. We should go back to the rate structure 
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which imposed the same tax rate (28%) on ordinary 
income (including dividends and interest) and capital gains. This is a much more 
defensible rate at a time where individuals are increasingly mobile, and should 
attract to this country some of the world’s abundant talent. 
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